ABSTRACT. Growing demand for cropland products has placed intense pressure on the ability of land resources to support nature, straining public budgets to purchase environmental goods.
Introduction. Rising real incomes, an expanding global population and biofuel policies
have increased demand for land under crops over the first decade of the 21 st century (Mitchell [2008] ). With a marked expansion of crop land and higher land rental rates, governments are posed with the problem of how best to provide a wide variety of environmental services when the price of obtaining these has increased. 1 A widely noted feature of these services is that spatial contiguity matters, and so the spatial arrangement of targeted land matters.
Services at issue include carbon sequestration where output is a global public good and spatial externalities are clearly secondary. They also include green space for outdoor amenities, flora and fauna habitat, as well as riparian buffer zones. For riparian buffer zones to encourage nature, reduce erosion, and filter chemical runoff, spatial effects likely involve local substitution.
This is because service provision by neighboring lands may be almost as effective. Substitution effects are also likely when woodland is intended to control rainwater flow and so prevent flooding. In other cases local complementarity is likely, as with contiguity in scenery or with existence value for an unspoiled ecosystem. Spatial fragmentation is especially harmful for larger plant and animal species, where a reduction in their presence can greatly alter the presence, extent, and behavior of other organisms, including the risk of species invasion, see for example Terborgh et al. [2001] or Damschen et al. [2006] .
In the presence of such spatial spillovers, there has been much debate on how to construct public policy to most efficiently provide ecological public goods. One way of doing so is to buy down farmer profit opportunities through requiring investments that increase environmental outputs or through purchasing restrictions on agricultural practices. In a widely cited paper, Green et al. [2005] developed on a suggestion in Waggoner [1995] that it may be optimal to load the buy downs on one set of acres, concentrating agricultural production on the remaining acres.
This is the intensification option.
1 For example, Iowa row cropland cash rent increased by about 35% between 2006 and 2009 Or it may be optimal to spread the buy downs across all acres so that all acres provide roughly similar bundles of agricultural production and environmental services. This is the extensification option. Which is optimal, they suggest, depends on the relationship between agricultural losses and environmental services. If the marginal reduction in environmental services due to an increase in agricultural outputs declines with an increase in these outputs (is convex) then intensification is the better policy. If the relation is concave then extensification is the better policy. Their model does not account for spatial spillovers. The intensification policy suggestion is controversial, see Jordan et al. [2007] , DeFries et al. [2007] , or Ceotto [2008] . See Tichit et al. [2007] , Scherr and McNeeley [2008] , or Fischer et al. [2008] for elaboration on how ecosystem and socioeconomic context matters in this debate.
In practice, both intensification and extensification policies have been enacted in the past.
The Conservation Reserve Program, which buys cropland out of production for periods of a decade or more, has been the primary policy instrument in the United States with 2009 budget of about $2 billion. Forestry schemes in the European Union have sought to convert farmland into deciduous and native woodland. Extensification-type agro-environmental policies have been more common in the European Union. Regulation 1257/1997 schemes support such activities as hedgerow restoration, maximum stocking rates, input use reductions, use of native species, production of organic crops, as well as rotation, green manure and fallowing practices where Donald and Evans [2006] provide a review. These schemes cover about 20 percent of EU farmland at an annual cost of about €3.5 billion (Whitfield [2006] ).
The effectiveness of agro-environmental schemes has been brought into question by Kleijn et al. [2001] and others, especially with respect to a lack of regard for scientific evaluation (Whitfield [2006] ). Many schemes may have had little or even ecologically adverse effects, a belief that may have led to cuts in funding for such EU programs. Regarding evaluation, Wätzold (Edwards, Smith and Johanns [2009] ).
and Schwerdtner [2005] point to a dearth of expertise at the interface of ecology and economics among those designing and implementing schemes.
Even at the level of academic evaluation, we note in particular that spatial interactions seldom enter assessment of such schemes despite widespread agreement that land contiguity and fragmentation are salient in any ecosystem. Recognizing the very decentralized organization of conservation endeavors and with an eye toward strategic public policy, Albers, Ando, and Chen [2008] consider spatial interactions between public land in conservation and private land trusts.
In Polasky et al. [2008] and papers cited therein, models with land contiguity effects have been developed to answer questions about how to arrange conservation and economic activities. The methods are, however, intended to provide practical assistance to the land manager and to draw lessons from case study applications. The methods are not as well suited to addressing analytic questions on land management.
A literature exists on providing incentives for the positive externalities generated by land use contiguities , Parkhurst et al. [2002] , Lewis and Plantinga [2007] , Tanaka [2008] , Drechsler and Wätzold [2009] ). The idea is to give an additional payment (agglomeration bonus) to those who sign their land up for an environmental program if a neighbor also does so or is in the process of doing so. In this way, the positive externality is at least partly endogenized. 2 As is typical of situations where positive externalities exist, many Nash equilibria are possible. Unlike much of the literature, the agglomeration bonus approach is concerned with feasible solutions rather than first-best solutions. Effective implementation would require adequate prior communication in order to ensure profitable coordination by landowners making the signup decision.
The intent of this article is to go some way toward including spatial effects in economic 2 Contexts exist where the potential may be large. These include the fragmented Atlantic forest region of South coastal Bahai, Brazil, where low profit farmed land intersperses forest (Chomitz et al. [2006] Choudhary and Orszag [2008] , and also Corazzini and Gianazza [2008] , have found the approach useful when seeking to understand local externalities.
Under general conditions we show that omission of spatially complementary spillovers may tilt policy toward extensification when a more intensive policy approach might be optimal.
Spatial complementarities penalize spatial disruptions in land use. As such they resemble a concavity, and might be seen as promoting extensification. Spatial complementarities also encourage the spatial concentration of land use to exploit complementarities, and so might be seen as a convexity that promotes intensification. As we shall show in Property 2, spatial externalities should be seen as neither a concavity nor a convexity. This leads us to our main theoretical point. This is that accommodating spatial spillovers in environmental services can admit a third alternative, not mentioned in the debate to this point. For identical farms located around a disc, this is that the first-best environmental buy down policy is to manage these spatial effects by smoothly varying the provision of environmental services as one moves across space.
Notice that while agglomeration bonuses do seek to account for spatial externalities in incentives, that literature has fixed the nature of program possibilities between enrolling or not enrolling in a single program. The third alternative we propose allows the program to vary with spatial location. We believe our approach is unique in suggesting that spatial externalities should motivate a spatially conditioned first-best program design. We show that optimum program buy meadowland for the butterfly Maculinea teleius in Germany (Drechsler et al. [2007] ).
down levels would follow a linear combination of a sine and cosine function around the circle. A land strip topology is also considered, leading to a markedly different optimal landscape design.
A practical interpretation of our findings is to approximate the optimal program by zones that moderate spatial variation in land use. In the United States, for example, many of the larger National Parks are surrounded by National Forests and other land use designations that restrict the nature and extent of human activities. Similar models are in place for National Parks throughout the world. In our penultimate section, we point to the structure of land use restrictions on National Parks to argue that our third alternative has in fact been implemented. We conclude with a brief discussion. 
Model.
Here, 0 c  and 0 q   while the market price for output is P c  so that all farms produce at q  absent a policy intervention. The government seeks to buy down production in order to provide environmental services. It is prepared to pay for a production buy down of R output in total, or an average of 
The conditions in (2) are just the modular arithmetic maps required on the disc to ensure that the 0 th and 1 N  th farms are neighbors. The derivative sign of
0.5 0  is intended to capture farm-level contiguity effects in the provision of environmental services. There is local complementarity so that marginal environmental benefits on a given farm increase with an increase in production buy down on neighboring farms.
Index  is obtained from averaging
over the set:
n n n n n n n r N A r r r N r r r r
is the lag 1 spatial covariance. The index can have a positive or negative value, and has upper bound ( ) v r . We adopt the index for two reasons. First-order autocovariance is a widely used modeling approach to characterizing 'nearness' effects so that technical machinery is well developed to work with it, and indeed with generalizations to higher order autocovariance structures (Hoel, Port and Stone [1972] ). A feature of the statistic that many would find agreeable is the way that first-order spatial covariance allows for gradual decay in effect as sites become more removed in spatial distance. The second motive for adopting the index is that the econometrics of spatial autocorrelation are well-developed (Anselin [1988] ) so that the index lends itself to empirical analysis.
To observe how the index captures cohesion, let 6 N  and 3 R  while assuming that the n r must take integer values 0 or 1. Then there are only three distinct arrangements of the reductions. 
where modular arithmetic has been applied to the subscripts.
M r r r r r r    as the vector reflection operation and we assert that a
. Finally with  as the composition operation, function ( ) f x is said to be invariant under reflection and rotation
is invariant under A) rotation, B) reflection, and consequently C) reflection and rotation composition.
As will also be the case for other results that are not immediate, demonstration of Property 1 is provided in the Appendix. We turn next to one possibility for gleaning inferences from these symmetries. Uniform curvature in conjunction with symmetry provides the potential for exploitable structure on level sets. 4 We will see next that any such opportunities will be qualified. Although qualified, we will show later that such opportunities do exist. The Hessian for the index is given by 
This is a circulant matrix in that the second row is obtained from applying a rotation operation on the first row, the third row is obtained from applying the same operation on the second row and so on. The eigenvalues of circulant matrices are highly structured, allowing us to obtain:
The index is neither concave nor convex. The eigenvalues of its Hessian matrix are
, and positive otherwise.
While 2 is always an eigenvalue, -2 is an eigenvalue only when N is even. All other eigenvalues arise twice whenever they arise at all. 4 For example, when ( ) :
is permutation symmetric such that any transfer 0   to increase i x by  and decrease j x by  increases the value of the sum
The eigenvalue symmetries together with Property 1 suggest that symmetric structure will be important to the analysis. Property 2 also suggests that trigonometric, or harmonic, analysis should prove useful in understanding how best to allocate buy downs. Throughout the analysis we will give content to these speculations.
Optimization problem.
For our first result we fix the values in vector r , but allow them to be arranged at will across the farms. Let ( ) T r be the set of all ! N rearrangements of vector ˆN r r   where, for convenience in presentation only, we assume the n r are distinct.
n r  be the n th least value of r . When N is
L r of This corollary tells us that even if the policy maker is restricted to rearrangements of some r r S   then the optimal solution will be highly symmetric. The optimal vector must be at least weakly decreasing over half the disc and weakly increasing over the other half. Notice too that the solutions are entirely ordinal, rank order is all that matters.
B) odd, then the maximizing arrangement is some rotation
We turn now to providing further rationalization of the cohesion index. In the next result, we do not confine attention to the set ( ) r T r  , but rather let the values be arbitrary on simplex S .
PROPOSITION 2: Consider a transfer ( , ) ( , ) if the farms flanking the latter have an average buy down that is higher than those flanking j r .
COROLLARY 2.1: Environmental services increase under the transfer considered in Proposition 2
Our findings above point to considerable structure on what increases environmental services.
Both propositions 1 and 2 suggest some sort of buy down agglomeration on a segment of the circle might be best. Concentration is an issue elsewhere in economics, as with income inequality and market power. There, such statistics as Gini coefficients and variance have been found to be relevant where well-known references are Atkinson [1970] and Bergstrom and Varian [1985] .
But these statistics do not account for spatial effects, and so are inappropriate in our context.
One way of allowing for spatial effects, and also providing opportunities for econometric study, is to present the chosen buy downs in spectral form. In our case, an additional advantage is the suitability of harmonic analysis for the circular topology. With
the spectral sum 
The intent of what is to follow is to provide exact conditions under which the mean and variance of production buy downs are held fixed, but the cohesion index increases.
We will first develop what we call summary coefficients. These account for the degrees of freedom that the spectral sum allows in fitting the buy down parameters. Drawing from both sets We are interested in the partial sums of these coefficients. Formally, define 
Bearing in mind that 0 a determines the value of r , we have PROPOSITION 4: Let spectral representations of r and r be given by 
under condition set (10). (12) has period 2 , i.e., one must travel around the entire disc before the sequential buy-down pattern repeats.
C) Let
Since we also know from Proposition 3 that To obtain a better sense of Part C), consider the additively separable form variance. Ignoring spatial complementarities may tilt the identified optimum toward a lower variance, or more extensive, policy choice. This has policy implications in light of i) the tendency to ignore these effects in policy assessments, and ii) previously mentioned concerns with the effectiveness of implemented agro-environmental schemes.
5. Between city and wilderness; Accounting for heterogeneities. Finally we ask how the production buy downs should be arranged under an alternative topographical setting. In order to demonstrate the general applicability of the approach, we will also allow for heterogeneities in this alternative model. So as to be explicit, suppose that the optimization problem is to choose r S  to maximize intended to capture farm-specific benefit heterogeneities due to locational idiosyncracies, perhaps arising from geographic features such as rivers, wetlands, or geological formations.
These parameters are net of the shadow cost of raising taxes so no explicit constraint on the sum of buy downs has been included.
The assumption is made that (19) is concave in r . 6 So were n n      on the disc topology studied to this point then extensification would be optimal. Consequently, there should be a tendency for the buy downs to be similar across farms in this setting too. This we call the cohesion force, and the resulting levels of n r will depend on the opportunity cost of tax dollars.
A simple calculation shows that setting /( 2 ) {1,2, ... , 2} 
Thus, asymmetries arise due to imposed boundary values. The system may be written as , . , {1,2, ... , 2}
D) The entries satisfy the unimodality properties Reserve has also proven successful with a population of perhaps 100 animals surviving on a remote coastal swampland patchwork of Defense Department, other Federal, and private lands.
H) With
However the Great Smoky Mountain National Park red wolf reintroduction program, commencing 1991, proved to be a failure and was discontinued in 1998. It was found that food needs forced wolf home ranges to outside park boundaries. In addition, wolves will breed with coyotes in the absence of an available mate so that viability is precluded for small populations in fragmented ranges. The Mexican gray wolf reintroduction in 1998 in the Gila National Forest region between Interstates 10, 25, 40, and 17 in Arizona and New Mexico has also had problems.
The wild population in 2009 was about 50 and pack formation has proven to be difficult (Cart [2009] ). Exceeding 5,000 square miles in area, deer and elk prey are in ample supply. But the region is without a significant national park while large tracts of the federal lands are leased for year-round grazing, suggesting that the spatial arrangement of ecological service buy-downs are part of the problem.
Another distinction relative to the Northern Rockies is that ranchers in the Southwest are not required to remove cattle carcasses in order to deter wolf scavenging. This land use restriction may indeed be more costly to impose in the Southwest so that willingness to pay grazing fees to the federal government would fall. Wolf predation on cattle is apparently more of a concern to ranchers in the Gila National Forest area, where wolves have been shot illegally. A 2005 compromise regulation has required the removal of wolves deemed responsible for multiple cattle deaths. Removals and relocations distort socialization and predation patterns. It should be noted that while ranchers are compensated for identified wolf kills and such kills are not large (Muhly and Musiani [2009] ), the producer incurs other uncompensated costs. And if, for whatever reason, livestock producers choose to sell out privately held land then the land may assume rural residency uses. Such uses would likely further fragment species range.
The core and periphery approach has also been adopted elsewhere, even in parts of the world where human landscape interventions are of long-standing. Vanoise, in the French High Alps, has a 200 square mile central zone surrounded by a 560 square mile peripheral zone. Intended as a buffer to protect the inner core, the outer disc allows restricted land use consistent with more traditional lifestyles. The intent is to manage the periphery so as to secure positive spatial external spillovers onto the core. Other French national parks that take this approach include the Cévennes in the Massif Central as well as Les Ecrins and Mercantour, both Alpine preserves. Job [2008] tabulates the core-periphery structure of a variety of major German National Parks where the periphery is referred to as a transition zone. All fourteen have significant transition zones. 8 7. Discussion. Working with a simple spatial model on a disc, this paper has sought to clarify some issues in agri-environmental policy. For farms identical in all ways, we find it may be optimal to treat them asymmetrically in order to avoid loss in ecosystem services due to fragmentation. In doing so, a trade off can arise if eco-service benefits on any given farm are concave. This trade off leads to the possibility of a third policy option, one not considered in the formal literature to this point. A smoothly varying buy down policy around the disc may be best, where we find a closed-form trigonometric solution for the optimal policy.
We also allow for farm-level heterogeneities in the provision of eco-services. In order to better understand the implications of topological structure, we model farm-level heterogeneities on a strip of land rather than on a closed disc. While the setting is very different, spatial spillovers lead to a preference for smooth variation in this situation too. If the boundaries are wilderness and the land between is homogeneous then the buy downs should largely be near the bounds, and will decrease steeply toward the center whenever the opportunity cost of tax funds is high. If the bounds are urban and the opportunity cost of tax funds is low then the buy downs will be at the center of the land strip.
The solutions we have identified are first-best for a given technology and preference structure. We have not considered implementation, where governments face political and information constraints. The literature on constrained first-best policies in the presence of spatial externalities is sparse. We hope that our model will allow for insights in this regard, beyond providing explicit benchmark solutions to the unconstrained problem.
As to the practical relevance of our work, a review of land use restrictions around National
Park systems throughout the world identifies public policy choices that effect the sort of graduated variation in land use that our model suggests as optimal. Our normative analysis can be viewed as consistent with public policy on ecological services. This may be policy as planned from the outset or as later adapted to better secure earlier or evolving ecological goals given political constraints and limited resources.
We see other applications of the general approach. One is to better understand spatial effects within city residency patterns where positive neighborhood spillovers can be seen in equilibria that involve family wealth gradients. Somewhat more abstractly parents worry about the friends children keep, perhaps in part arising from beliefs about behavioral norms, peer effects, and mutual re-enforcement. Public health studies lend credence to these concerns. For example, Christakis and Fowler [2007] have identified social effects in the propensity to become obese where these effects are not entirely explained by the endogenous formation of social ties by people of different body mass indices. If a group of individuals are arranged in a circle and each person is viewed as being friends of just the contiguous neighbors on either side, then our model may be able to say something about equilibrium behavior concerning diet, social deviancy, personal discipline, and parenting.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Property 1. Since 
Suppose instead the farms are not adjacent. Then (A5) [ 1] [ 1]
As for variance, r does not change so we need only consider the effect on the sum of 
Consider each of these four right-hand terms in turn. For the first, use
But multiplication of the first inner product of sums and then use of the orthogonality property 
Multiply out the remaining inner product of sums in (A9) and apply orthogonality property 
The sum in (A7) therefore resolves to 
The orthogonality conditions laid out above, i.e., where the sum of a product equals 0, readily leads to cos tan / ; sin tan / ;
where the signs must match. Consequently the knowledge 
